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FOURTH AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT IS AFOOT:
REVITALIZING PARTICULARIZED REASONABLE
SUSPICION FOR TERRY STOPS BASED ON VAGUE OR
DISCREPANT SUSPECT DESCRIPTIONS
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INTRODUCTION
On Lawrence Harbin’s walk home one Monday night, police
officers began to trail close behind him in their cruiser.1 The officers
followed Mr. Harbin for a brief period, and he soon made it to his
home in Alexandria, Virginia, stepping onto his front porch.2 As Mr.
Harbin stepped inside his living room, he heard police officers yell
to him through the open front door, ordering him to stop and stay in
place.3 He turned to find an officer ordering him to put his hands
where the officers could see them.4 Mr. Harbin complied and, moving carefully to the porch, began to explain to the officers who he
was.5 Officers responded by reinstructing him to keep his hands up,
and one officer approached him with his hand ready on his holstered
firearm.6
Mr. Harbin’s wife emerged from their home, insisting to the officers that he was her husband.7 There on his front porch, an officer
patted down Mr. Harbin, finding no weapons.8 The officer asked Mr.
Harbin for identification, which he produced.9 It was then that an
officer asked Mr. Harbin, “Did I see you at 7-Eleven[?] Oh! It must
have been someone else. We are stopping everybody—and are not
taking any chances.”10 The officers then left.11
About thirty or forty minutes prior to these events, and a few
blocks away from Mr. Harbin’s home, officers had received a report
that a man brandished a gun at a 7-Eleven and fled on foot.12 The
officers spotted Mr. Harbin walking home and thought he might be
that man.13 However, the gun-brandishing suspect was described as
1. Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 69 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, 908 F.2d 967
(4th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 69.
13. See id.
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a six-foot-three-inch tall Black man of large and stocky build, wearing a blue knit cap and a waist-length blue jacket that may have
been a ski parka.14 Mr. Harbin was a Black man of average build
and was wearing a two-tone gray and black jacket, brown business
dress pants, brown dress shoes, a white shirt, a light gray sweater,
and no cap.15
Displeased with the ordeal to which the police officers subjected
him, Mr. Harbin decided to sue the police and the city for civil rights
violations, representing himself pro se.16 He asserted that the police
had little reason to think that he was the gun-brandishing man
from earlier in the night, and they indeed had the wrong man.17
However, he would see little relief as the federal district court found
“ample” support for upholding the officers’ actions—the stop and
frisk of Mr. Harbin on his front porch “f[e]ll well within Terry.”18
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court granted law enforcement
broad power to perform a limited stop and search of someone when
an officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in
criminal activity.19 The resulting “Terry stop” created a way for
police officers to investigate a suspicious person without requiring
full probable cause for an arrest.20 The officer need only have “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts”21 based on the
circumstances and the officer’s policing “experience that criminal
activity may be afoot.”22 Reasonable suspicion is—by design—a
broad standard, deferential to police officers’ judgment.23 Law
enforcement officers across the United States employ this powerful
tool extensively, performing millions of Terry stops each year.24
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 68.
17. See id. at 71.
18. Id.
19. See 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
20. See id. at 27.
21. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
23. See id. at 10-12; Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men
and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998).
24. See Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 347 n.1 (2019). In New York City alone, about half-a-million people
are stopped annually. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.2(f) n.296 (6th ed. 2020). In Seattle, a city with less than one-tenth the
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Mr. Harbin’s scenario presents a fairly compelling case for the
police having this wide discretion. Someone has just brandished a
gun in a patron-filled convenience store and fled to the surrounding
neighborhood. The suspect may escape apprehension or may even
continue to cause more danger in the immediate community. But
the officers have an important piece of information aiding their
search: a physical description of the suspect. Undoubtedly, this factor will drive their search of the nearby area. And, should they come
upon someone who fits the description, it will substantially—if not
wholly—inform the officers’ reasonable suspicion to stop that person
to investigate.
But what if that suspect description is vague, consisting of few
descriptors? Or what if, like in Mr. Harbin’s case, there are many
discrepancies between the description given and the appearance of
the person the officers eventually stop under suspicion that he is the
perpetrator? When reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk someone
is based largely on a physical description of a criminal suspect, how
“particularized”25 must that description be?
This Note examines this specific reasonable suspicion factor: the
resemblance of a person stopped under Terry to an active suspect
description of someone who has very recently committed a crime.
Exploring this scenario, this Note seeks to analyze courts’ varying
tolerance levels for vague or discrepant suspect descriptions creating reasonable suspicion, discuss the detrimental and unconstitutional impacts of an overly broad standard for this reasonable
suspicion factor, and propose a new standard for courts to employ.
Part I describes the Terry stop’s origin and standards, including
the Terry Court’s balance of public safety and individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights. Part II explores the scenario under examination
in this Note and analyzes trends in various courts’ treatment of this
factor in reasonable suspicion determinations. Part III discusses
population of New York City, police performed over six thousand Terry stops in 2020—a year
of considerably less criminal activity and fewer street stops. See Seattle Police Dep’t, Terry
Stops Dashboard, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/police/information-and-data/terrystops/terry-stops-dashboard [https://perma.cc/NTL6-45F2]; see also Neil MacFarquhar &
Serge F. Kovaleski, A Pandemic Bright Spot: In Many Places, Less Crime, N.Y. TIMES (May
28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/coronavirus-crime.html [https://perma.cc/
3743-Z2XV].
25. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
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the dangers of an overbroad reasonable suspicion standard and
argues that courts’ high tolerance of vague or discrepant suspect
descriptions informing officers’ suspicion threatens individuals’
Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, Part IV proposes a new legal
standard for weighing this reasonable suspicion factor whereby
courts look for indicia of particularization when a suspect description contributes to a Terry stop. This new standard would revitalize
the particularization requirement of Terry and the Fourth Amendment, better protect individuals’ rights against unreasonable intrusion, and promote more effective and equitable policing. Ultimately,
this new standard would better balance the needs with which the
Terry Court grappled: public safety and individuals’ dignity.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, TERRY STOPS, AND
REASONABLE SUSPICION
An understanding of Fourth Amendment protections, how the
Supreme Court formulated the Terry standard, and the development
of Terry stops thereafter is a critical foundation to a discussion of
reasonable suspicion based on suspect descriptions. The Fourth
Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons[,] houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”26 Until 1968, the standard for seizing someone in accordance with the Fourth Amendment required probable
cause.27 In Terry v. Ohio, however, the Supreme Court adopted a
rule permitting brief investigatory detentions pursuant to a
standard that falls short of probable cause.28
In Terry, a police officer witnessed the two codefendants “casing”
a store—taking turns repeatedly walking past the store window and
looking in.29 The officer feared a robbery was soon to take place and
that the men may have a gun.30 The officer confronted the men to
investigate further and performed a pat-down search of their outer

26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. Russell L. Jones, Terry v. Ohio: Its Failure, Immoral Progeny, and Racial Profiling,
54 IDAHO L. REV. 511, 514 (2018).
28. See 392 U.S. at 27; see also Jones, supra note 27, at 514.
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
30. Id. at 6.
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clothing, indeed revealing two firearms.31 The trial court recognized
that the officer’s actions fell in some gray area between a probable
cause arrest and a consensual encounter.32 Yet, it held that the
officer was right to frisk the men for protective purposes when he
had “reasonable cause” to believe that the men might be armed, and
a frisk of this nature was different than a full arrest and search for
evidence of a crime.33 The trial court had stated that, without the
ability to perform a frisk in this type of situation, “the answer to the
police officer may be a bullet.”34
The Supreme Court agreed that the officer’s actions were necessary, despite him lacking probable cause.35 The Court handed down
a new standard, holding that a police officer may briefly detain36
and perform a limited search of an individual when the officer has
reasonable suspicion “in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous.”37 Thus, the “Terry stop”
was born.

31. Id. at 7.
32. See id. at 7-8 (“[I]t ‘would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension’
to find that [the officer] had had probable cause.”). Officers may approach and question an
individual without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991). In such consensual encounters, a seizure has not occurred “and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id.
33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 24.
36. The majority opinion in Terry focused on searches rather than seizures and went as
far as denying any intention of ruling for a standard lower than probable cause for detentions—just pat-down searches. See id. at 19 n.16. However, the Court soon conceded—as
many had already construed—that Terry and reasonable suspicion did in fact apply to brief
investigatory detentions. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972); see also
Jennifer E. Laurin, Terry, Timeless and Time-Bound, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6 (2017).
37. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court strictly limited the scope of a weapons search that
may occur during a Terry stop, noting that “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for
weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion.” Id. at 24-25. Consequently, such a
search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation....[I]t
must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less
than a ‘full’ search.” Id. at 26 (citation omitted). In Terry, this standard was met because the
officer patted down the individuals’ outer clothing and reached into pockets or underneath
clothing only when he felt weapons. See id. at 29-30.
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The Terry Court established guardrails for what can amount to
reasonable suspicion.38 In justifying a stop and search pursuant to
Terry, an officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”39 Reasonable suspicion
requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch.’”40 And it must be assessed objectively—the officer’s good
faith will not carry the day.41 Putting its new legal standard to work
on the facts of Terry, the Court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the two men because their behavior
near the storefront suggested, in the officer’s experience, that they
were casing the store for a robbery—possibly an armed robbery.42
The officer was entitled to quickly act to investigate and address the
possible danger to himself and others nearby.43
However, it would fall upon other cases and other courts to
further develop what circumstances and particularized facts would
amount to reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Today, reasonable
suspicion is commonly borne out of some combination of factors,
such as the detainee being present in a high-crime area,44 behaving
evasively,45 fleeing from the police,46 exhibiting nervousness,47

38. See id. at 21-23.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 27.
41. Id. at 21-22.
42. See id. at 5-6, 30.
43. Id. at 30.
44. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (defendant fled upon seeing
approaching police in an area known for frequent drug crime).
45. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989) (defendant, while driving, immediately turned off the highway to avoid a police officer after making eye contact).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 351 F. Supp. 3d 214, 217, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(defendant ran from a police officer who had begun to exit his patrol car to approach the
defendant and continued running when the officer pursued him).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Atlas, 94 F.3d 447, 449-51 (8th Cir. 1996) (defendant’s eyes
grew wide upon seeing the police officer, and he appeared very nervous when the officer approached him and asked a few questions).
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performing a set of actions consistent with common criminal
operations,48 or exhibiting signs of being armed,49 among others.50
The Terry Court was in uncharted territory when tasked with resolving the question of whether brief investigatory stops and frisks
comported with the Fourth Amendment, thus rendering evidence
acquired during such encounters admissible in subsequent criminal
proceedings.51 The Court was not without concern for overbroad
police discretion or potential Fourth Amendment infringement.52
However, after balancing individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights
against unwarranted intrusions with the desirability of a flexible
tool that allows officers to respond rapidly to dangerous situations,53
the resulting standard remains highly deferential to police discretion.54 By design, the reasonable suspicion standard for a lawful
Terry stop is broadly worded and construed, deferring considerably
to the judgment of law enforcement as informed by their daily
policing experience.55

48. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11 (1989) (defendant’s behavior in
an airport was typical of that of a drug courier).
49. See, e.g., Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1260, 1264 (Del. 2001) (defendant clutched
a large bulge characteristic of a weapon in his jacket pocket).
50. See LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 9.6(a) (surveying reasonable suspicion factors that have
formed the basis for Terry stops and citing exemplifying cases).
51. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1968) (“We would be less than candid if we did not
acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding
a sensitive area of police activity—issues which have never before been squarely presented
to this Court.”).
52. See id. at 22 (“If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964))).
53. See id. at 10-12.
54. See Maclin, supra note 23, at 1278 (“Without saying so, Terry fundamentally changed
Fourth Amendment law.... After Terry, police intrusions would be controlled by a malleable
‘reasonableness’ standard that gave enormous discretion to the police.”).
55. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-12; see also United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 213 (4th
Cir. 2018) (“‘Reasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical standard,’ ... ‘that deal[s]
with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” (alteration in original) (first quoting United States v.
Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2016); then quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 695 (1996)).
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II. WHEN PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Before examining the constitutional and policing issues implicated by Terry stops based on active suspect descriptions, it is
essential to analyze how courts tend to treat this suspect description
factor in reasonable suspicion determinations. This analysis demonstrates that many courts have espoused a tolerance for officers
conducting Terry stops pursuant to a suspect description that was
either vague and applicable to many people in the area or one that
was significantly discrepant with the eventual detainee’s appearance.56 Other courts, however, have displayed a lower tolerance,
expressing constitutionality concerns when officers conduct Terry
stops based on insufficiently particularized descriptions.57 Ultimately, this analysis reveals that courts fall on a vast spectrum of
how they treat unparticularized suspect descriptions as the basis for
a Terry stop.58 Before examining this spectrum, however, the unique
considerations that this particular factor implicates are worth
noting.
A. Distinctive Considerations of the Physical Description
Factor in Active Suspect Searches
As discussed, the Terry Court contemplated the delicate balance
between protecting individuals’ Fourth Amendment search and
seizure rights and the need for police to better protect public safety,
even when full probable cause for an arrest is lacking.59 This
balance is particularly salient in the context of law enforcement
actively searching for a suspect of a very recently commissioned
crime and operating pursuant to a physical description of the
perpetrator.
In this scenario, the public safety concerns are especially heightened for several reasons. First, the officer knows going in (barring
56.
57.
58.
59.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.B-C.
See supra Part I.
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false reporting) that criminal activity is “afoot”60 rather than
developing such suspicion anew based on the actions of a person the
officer encounters.61 In some cases, the person reporting the crime
may be able to provide details that indicate the level of danger the
suspect poses—for example, whether the person has a weapon.
These elements—whether a person is engaged in criminal activity
and whether he or she poses a danger warranting a frisk—are
central to the purpose and function of Terry stops and reasonable
suspicion62 and would be much more established in this scenario.
Lastly, because someone has just committed a crime and departed
the scene, he or she may be more volatile or may perpetrate further
wrongdoing to evade apprehension.63 This context enhances the
desirability of granting police fairly wide latitude to quickly stop
someone they believe to be the offender. The urgency and high
stakes of this scenario support the need for a flexible standard for
law enforcement.64
However, just as this scenario presents heightened public safety
needs, it also presents a situation in which the factors contributing
to an officer’s reasonable suspicion that an individual is the suspect
for whom they are searching will likely be—or should be—relatively
narrow. Because the officer is operating pursuant to a known
location, criminal act, and physical description of the suspect, these
factors should predominately drive the officer’s reasonable suspicion. Other common reasonable suspicion factors may be rendered
irrelevant by virtue of the officer having this concrete information
about the crime.65 With the spotlight narrowed by the information
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
61. See Aliza Hochman Bloom, When Too Many People Can Be Stopped: The Erosion of
Reasonable Suspicion Required for a Terry Stop, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 257, 262-63 (2018).
62. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26, 30.
63. One can imagine this dynamic at play in the example of an armed robbery. The
perpetrator, having fled the scene, may continue carrying out crimes ancillary to completing
the robbery, such as stealing a car or driving away in a manner that endangers others on the
road. Further, because the robber is actively evading apprehension, there is a heightened
possibility for additional danger if the robber encounters obstacles, as tension and selfpreservation instincts will be high. This hypothetical contrasts with the common Terry stop
scenario in which an officer happens upon someone displaying suspicious conduct, rather than
a reported crime initiating the officer’s actions. See Bloom, supra note 61, at 262.
64. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
65. Cf. Bloom, supra note 61, at 263, 266 (arguing that, once an officer is responding to
a completed, reported crime, some other reasonable suspicion factors become irrelevant, such
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at the officer’s disposal, the basis for reasonable suspicion should
also be more circumscribed. In sum, this scenario should provide
officers with more targeted information and particularized suspicion
from the outset, but it also tends to amplify the need for latitude in
performing Terry stops.
B. Courts’ High Tolerance for Vague or Discrepant Suspect
Descriptions that Contribute to Reasonable Suspicion for
a Terry Stop
Plenty of courts have found the requisite reasonable suspicion for
a Terry stop present when officers acted pursuant to a sparse, widely applicable suspect description. In Commonwealth v. Mercado,
officers responded to a shooting in which the suspects’ description
was merely “three Hispanic males.”66 Upon the officers’ arrival to
the scene, a bystander told them that a shirtless Black or Hispanic
man was acting aggressively in a nearby store.67 An officer witnessed two “Spanish” males begin to exit the store, hesitate upon
seeing the officer, but eventually step outside.68 The officer immediately stopped and frisked the men.69 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found that this satisfied reasonable suspicion, reversing the lower court that held otherwise, even stating that “it
would have been poor police work” to not perform the stop.70
The Seventh Circuit recently demonstrated a similarly high tolerance in United States v. Street.71 Police responded to an armed
robbery perpetrated by two Black men wearing hooded sweatshirts.72 The officers saw a vehicle containing the items stolen in the
robbery and noticed three Black men nearby walking toward a store
entrance.73 After losing sight of two of the men, the officers executed
an evacuation of the entire nearby store.74 When the defendant
as whether the person is in a high-crime neighborhood).
66. 663 N.E.2d 243, 244 (Mass. 1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id. at 245-47 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)).
71. 917 F.3d 586, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2019).
72. Id. at 590.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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exited, his clothing did not match the suspect description, but he
was the only Black man among the crowd of store patrons.75 Officers
stopped and questioned him, gaining information later used to
arrest him.76
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment
does not permit “dragnet[ ]” searches, and a broadly applicable physical description will not, without more, justify a seizure.77 Yet, it
held that Terry “does not require perfection or precision” and found
the requisite reasonable suspicion present.78 Citing numerous
comparable precedents, the court stated that the officers “had more
general descriptions than was ideal.... But a lack of better, more detailed descriptions does not mean officers must disregard the limited
information they do have.”79 Thus, the totality of the circumstances
compensated for the fact that such vague physical descriptions
typically “are not enough to support reasonable suspicion.”80
Courts’ high tolerance continues in cases with many discrepancies
between the operative suspect description and the physical appearance of who officers stopped. In United States v. Shelton, an armed
robber was described as “wearing a black long-sleeved shirt, black
long sweater, black pants.... [A] black male, five-feet five-inches tall,
weighing approximately 140 pounds, and wearing sunglasses, what
appeared to be black tape or covering on his fingers, and a ‘tan
camo[uflaged] bucket hat.’”81 The officer soon happened upon the
defendant close to the robbery location, walking down the street and
talking on his phone.82 While he was indeed a Black male around
the robber’s reported height, no other descriptors matched—Shelton
was wearing blue jeans and a gray tank top, no hat, had nothing on
his fingertips, and was holding nothing else in his hands.83 The
officer sat the defendant on a curb to investigate further, which the
court held was a lawful Terry stop based on reasonable, articulable
75. Id. at 591.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 594.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 589-90, 595 (quoting United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2014)).
81. No. 1:11CR397-1, 2012 WL 13075291, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2012) (alteration in
original).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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suspicion that Shelton was the suspect for whom the officer was
searching.84 The court scarcely discussed the stark differences between the suspect description and the defendant’s appearance,
instead heavily weighing the fact that Shelton and the robbery
suspect both had facial hair, a fact that the officer learned after
detaining Shelton on the curb.85
This level of discrepancy—and courts’ tolerance of it—is also
present in Mr. Harbin’s case discussed at the outset of this Note.86
Despite the disparities in body type and clothing, these “minor discrepancies” were nonetheless deemed “far too slender a reed on
which to base a constitutional violation.”87 The court upheld the
officers’ Terry stop and frisk, finding that they “undeniably had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion.”88
In addition to a high tolerance for appearance discrepancies
generally, courts also tolerate discrepancies with “readily modifiable
aspect[s] of one’s appearance such as outerwear.”89 Courts’ acceptance of both highly discrepant physical appearances and vague,
widely applicable descriptions forming the basis for a stop demonstrates that police officers in many jurisdictions enjoy a low bar to
exercising the discretion Terry gives them.90

84. Id. at *5.
85. Id. at *3, *5 (“Officer Price then noticed Shelton’s facial hair. While a determination
that the robber did not have facial hair would have excluded Shelton as a suspect, its presence would be an additional factor linking Shelton to the crime.”).
86. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
87. Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 69, 71 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, 908 F.2d
967 (4th Cir. 1990).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Slater, 979 F.3d 626, 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding reasonable
suspicion despite the detainee’s khaki jacket over a gray hoodie and bulky winter coat not
matching the suspects’ clothing description of “brown hoodies”); see also United States v.
Scott, 420 F. Supp. 3d 295, 304, 312 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion when the
defendants were not wearing the hooded sweatshirt and turquoise scarf worn by the robbery
perpetrators because “[o]uter clothing such as a woolen mask, scarf, and sweatshirt, can be
discarded within a few seconds”).
90. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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C. Courts’ Low Tolerance for Vague or Discrepant Suspect
Descriptions that Contribute to Reasonable Suspicion for
a Terry Stop
Many courts have demonstrated that suspect descriptions providing little more than race and gender are unacceptable as the
grounds for an officer’s reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. In
United States v. Jones, an anonymous 911 caller reported “several
black males” drinking and causing a disturbance in a road intersection.91 An officer spotted four Black men in a vehicle within a quarter mile of the reported intersection and, pursuant to the “several
black males” description, stopped the vehicle.92 Noticing an open
beer bottle in the vehicle, the officer asked the passengers to exit the
vehicle, searched the entire car, and arrested the defendant.93
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence recovered on the defendant during the stop and
vacated the conviction.94 It held that the officer’s suspicion and stop
of the men based on the anonymous tip’s description of several
Black males was “insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for
a stop.”95 The tip was “barren of detail about the alleged culprits’
physical descriptions ... and apart from mentioning their race, gave
no information about their appearance.”96
Other courts have agreed that “[u]nparticularized racial descriptions, devoid of distinctive or individualized physical details ...
cannot by themselves provide police with adequate justification for
stopping an individual member of the identified race who happens
to be in the general area.”97 In Commonwealth v. Grinkley, police
responded to a witness report that a group of Black and Hispanic
youths had a gun at a public tennis court and that a fight was soon

91. 242 F.3d 215, 216 (4th Cir. 2001).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 216-17.
94. Id. at 216.
95. Id. at 218-19. Although weighing into the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the officer’s
actions was the fact that the description was provided by an anonymous, uncorroborated 911
tip, the court’s decision conveys a general intolerance of such an unparticularized physical
description of a suspect. See id.
96. Id. at 218.
97. Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 688 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).

1812

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1797

to break out.98 The officers approached a group of Black youths in
the tennis court’s vicinity, who began to walk away upon the officers’ arrival, and stopped and frisked them.99 On these facts, the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop because the witness report was a mere
general description of race and location.100
In the striking case of Brown v. City of Oneonta, the Second
Circuit reinforced this lower tolerance for unparticularized physical
descriptions.101 In Brown, a class action civil rights suit,102 the city
police responded to a break-in and violent attack of an elderly
woman by performing a “sweep of Oneonta, stopping and questioning” individuals who matched the description given by the victim.103
The physical description of the suspect was that of a young Black
male with a cut on his hand.104 In just a few days, police questioned
over two hundred individuals, relying almost entirely on this sparse
physical description.105 Although some of the questionings did not
amount to a Terry stop,106 the Second Circuit sided with several
plaintiffs who were seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.107 The court disapproved of basing reasonable suspicion on
such a vague and widely applicable physical description of a suspect,
stating that “a description of race and gender alone will rarely
provide reasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure.”108
Courts have also drawn a line when suspects’ physical descriptions included features beyond race or gender but still could have
applied to an impermissibly large number of individuals in the area.
98. Id. at 460.
99. Id. at 460-61.
100. Id. at 462, 467.
101. 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. In many cases, including some mentioned throughout this Note, individuals challenge
the reasonableness of a Terry stop to which they were subjected on Equal Protection Clause
or Fourth Amendment grounds in a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
103. Brown, 221 F.3d at 334.
104. Id. The victim identified the suspect’s race from seeing his hand and forearm and his
youth based on the speed with which he traversed the room. Id.
105. See id. The police never apprehended the attacker. Id.
106. Id. at 341. In consensual police-citizen encounters, officers may approach and question
someone without implicating the Fourth Amendment or needing reasonable suspicion. Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
107. Brown, 221 F.3d at 340-41.
108. Id. at 334.
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In Commonwealth v. Cheek, for example, a stabbing suspect’s
description—a Black male wearing a black three-quarter length
down jacket—could have fit a large number of men in the predominantly Black neighborhood.109 Thus, the officers’ suspicion was not
sufficiently particularized.110 In Washington v. Lambert, the Ninth
Circuit demonstrated a low tolerance for descriptions that were
“exceedingly vague and general” as well as quite discrepant with
the appearance of the eventual detainees.111 There, the description
was too general because it amounted to two Black males, one somewhat short and one somewhat tall.112 Additionally, the discrepancies
in weight and body type with the men stopped pursuant to this
description were substantial enough for the court to find an insufficient basis for the Terry stop.113
The sentiments of various courts around reasonable suspicion
based on vague or discrepant physical descriptions, as well as the
pervasive and racially biased stop and frisk practices of some
localities,114 culminated in the landmark case Floyd v. City of New
York.115 The 195-page opinion reflected deep concerns with not only
the soaring number of Terry stops and frisks performed,116 but also

109. 597 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1992).
110. Id.; see also, e.g., Faulk v. State, 574 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding
that an armed robbery suspect description of a young Black male wearing a multicolored shirt
“contained no identifiable characteristics which would serve to distinguish them from the
general populace” (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972))).
111. 98 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 1190-91 (“If the general descriptions relied on here can be stretched to cover
Washington and Hicks, then a significant percentage of African-American males walking,
eating, going to work or to a movie, ball game or concert, with a friend or relative, might well
find themselves subjected to similar treatment, at least if they are in a predominantly white
neighborhood. Moreover, other equally general descriptions could serve as the basis for
similar demeaning treatment of many other African-Americans.”).
113. See id. The two suspects were described as about 6’1” and 150-170 pounds and about
5’6” and 170-190 pounds. Id. at 1183-84. The detainees, conversely, were 6’4” and 235 pounds
and 5’7½” and 135-140 pounds. Id. at 1184.
114. See N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011: NYCLU BRIEFING 1-2 (2012),
https://perma.cc/TQ4Q-J537; Press Release, ACLU, Boston Police Data Shows Widespread
Racial Bias in Street Encounters with Civilians (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/boston-police-data-shows-widespread-racial-bias-street-encounters-civilians
[https://perma.cc/8426-V8X5].
115. See 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
116. See id. at 591-92 (“How did the NYPD increase its stop activity by roughly 700%,
despite the fact that crime continued to fall during this period?”).
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the disproportionate number of stops aimed at racial minorities.117
The opinion discussed the dangers of permitting broad Terry stops
based on a general physical description, stating that “‘Fits Description’ is a troubling basis for a stop if the description is so general
that it fits a large portion of the population in the area, such as
black males between the ages of 18 and 24.”118 The court detailed
examples of this impermissible standard, the result often being that
all nearby individuals within a wide demographic were “subjected
to heightened police attention.”119 Floyd emphatically held that the
vague description of a young Black male suspect could not supply
the requisite individualized suspicion for a Terry stop of someone
matching that description.120
These cases demonstrate a fairly widespread recognition that a
suspect description relaying merely race, gender, and general age or
body type will not provide a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion.
Additionally, there is an unwillingness among some courts to consider a slightly more detailed physical description to be “particularized” if those additional details could apply to many individuals in
the area or do not adequately match the detainee’s appearance.
However, these holdings are almost always case-specific and rarely
draw a clear line for future cases due to reasonable suspicion being
a totality-of-circumstances analysis. Thus, while these cases help
preserve the particularization requirement of Terry for this reasonable suspicion factor, they nonetheless exhibit a wide spectrum of
treatment by the courts.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION IN THE
CONTEXT OF SUSPECT DESCRIPTIONS
The Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable searches
and seizures and its protection of the right for people to enjoy personal security free from unreasonable governmental intrusion were

117. See id. at 556, 562.
118. Id. at 578.
119. Id. at 605, 630-33 (detailing Cornelio McDonald’s case and stating “because two black
males committed crimes in Queens, all black males in that borough were subjected to heightened police attention”).
120. See id. at 630.
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fundamental considerations in Terry.121 Thus, despite Terry stops
being intended as an expansion of police power to seize and search
people,122 the bar for reasonable suspicion should not be set too low.
The degree to which an operative suspect description is overly
discrepant or vague will typically be just one of several factors contributing to an officer’s reasonable suspicion.123 Terry is a totality-ofthe-factors standard, meaning each factor does not need to establish
reasonable suspicion standing alone.124 In fact, there will be cases
in which the suspect description is generic or discrepant with the
detainee’s appearance to an arguably impermissible degree, but the
other factors and circumstances surrounding the Terry stop justify
the officer’s decision.125 It is still vital, however, that this factor be
properly particularized, and that an impermissibly unparticularized
description does not become muddled in the balance of the other
reasonable suspicion factors in a given case. If an apparently strong
showing of reasonable suspicion is due to a collection of factors that,
when examined alone, are not worthy of much weight, courts risk
betraying the particularized, “articulable” suspicion standard that
the Terry Court imparted.126
This Part explores the importance of truly particularized reasonable suspicion in the context of both Terry stops generally and the
suspect description factor. The myriad negative impacts of Terry
stops and the issues with particularization found in other common
reasonable suspicion factors demonstrate the need for a narrowly
crafted reasonable suspicion standard. Considering many courts’
high tolerance for vague or discrepant suspect descriptions discussed in Part II.B, the lack of particularization allows for Fourth
Amendment infringement. To prevent the Terry stop from being a
tool so flexible that it provides a blank check for officers to stop too

121. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
122. Id. at 10-11.
123. See generally supra Part II.
124. See United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable
suspicion when an officer approached two men matching the description of two Black men,
one of whom was wearing a black leather jacket, when they were very close to the recent
crime scene, one man was unusually nervous, and the second began circling behind the officer
threateningly).
126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 27.
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many individuals, the reasonable suspicion standard around physical descriptions must change.
A. A Narrowly Crafted Reasonable Suspicion Standard Is Critical
Terry’s lone dissenter, Justice Douglas, expressed deep concerns
over the new reasonable suspicion standard falling short of probable
cause and what power that would bestow upon law enforcement.127
He stated: “The term ‘probable cause’ rings a bell of certainty that
is not sounded by phrases such as ‘reasonable suspicion’ .... [I]f the
police can pick [an individual] up whenever they do not like the cut
of his jib, ... we enter a new regime.”128 These concerns were apt as,
over five decades later, Terry stops are a pervasive policing tool.129
Today, Terry stops have far-reaching harms for those subjected to
them, including legal consequences and physical and psychological
harms.130 Further, racial minorities are disproportionately subjected
to Terry stops.131 These impacts, as well as evidence of insufficient
particularization in several other common reasonable suspicion factors, demonstrate that a narrowly crafted standard is critical.
1. The Harms of Terry Stops and the Disparate Policing and
Stops of Racial Minorities
The Terry Court itself recognized over fifty years ago the potential
harms of over-policing, especially for racial minorities.132 Investigatory stops and frisks, however brief and limited, are more than a
minor indignity or inconvenience133—they can “be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”134 Stops and
frisks are “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and [they
127. See id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The infringement on personal liberty of any
‘seizure’ of a person can only be ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment if we require the
police to possess ‘probable cause’ before they seize him.”).
128. Id. at 37, 39.
129. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
132. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-15.
133. See id. at 10-11.
134. Id. at 25.
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are] not to be undertaken lightly.”135 These encounters can be “hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or
loss of life.”136 The Court specifically noted that minority groups,
especially Black communities, disproportionately feel the brunt of
police harassment.137
The Terry Court was right to worry. Police perform millions of
Terry stops every year,138 a disparately high proportion of which
involve racial minorities.139 Implicit racial bias almost certainly
contributes to this high number.140 It is no coincidence that the cases
examined herein largely involved Black individuals.141 Additionally,
studies that have analyzed police behavior during these stops show
that law enforcement officers are more likely to use force against
racial minorities than against white people, and investigatory stops
of racial minorities are more likely to progress into a full arrest.142
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id. at 14.
138. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
139. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk
as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2412, 2418-29 (2017) (finding that
Terry stop and frisk measures are highly concentrated in minority neighborhoods and refuting
arguments that this type of Terry stop provides the crime control benefits to justify such
concentration); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding,
based on expert testimony, that the New York Police Department performed Terry stops on
Black and Hispanic residents at rates higher than white residents); ACLU FOUND. OF MASS.,
BLACK, BROWN, AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010 1 (2014), https://www.aclum.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP6G-UE7G] (finding that,
between 2007-2010 in Boston, over 63 percent of those subjected to Terry stops and similar
police encounters were Black, despite Black residents making up just 24 percent of Boston’s
population).
140. See Kristin Henning, The Reasonable Black Child: Race, Adolescence, and the Fourth
Amendment, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1513, 1543-49 (2018) (discussing research on implicit racial
bias, such as officers’ increased likelihood to interpret innocuous behavior or expressions as
violent and aggressive when from Black people as opposed to from white people, and arguing
that this bias contributes to the increased policing of Black individuals). See generally L. Song
Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73 (2017) (discussing implicit racial bias in the policing context and
finding that the Terry standard results in police interactions being driven by racial hunches,
racial anxiety, and bias).
141. See generally supra Part II.
142. See LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
NCJ 242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 1 (2013, rev. 2016),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9J-22C6]; Jeffrey Fagan,
Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson & April Pattavina, Stops and Stares: Street Stops,
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The harms of Terry stops go well beyond physical injuries or
harsher legal consequences. Terry stops cause stigma and shame,
particularly when people are stopped despite being innocent, while
with family, or as a result of being singled out for their race.143 Terry
stops can provoke reactive physical violence and can be rife with
verbal aggression, racial remarks, or sexual overtones.144 Studies
have even found elevated rates of post-traumatic stress disorder
symptoms among those most often stopped.145 Increased policing is
also linked to greater instances of stress, high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma, and other health conditions.146
Beyond inappropriate encounters, trauma, and physical harm,
improper arrests have collateral consequences, such as loss of employment, housing, benefits, or family stability.147 Stories from those
subjected to Terry stops are punctuated with feelings of confusion,
fright, embarrassment, and dehumanization.148 In other words, the
humiliation and fear that the Terry Court acknowledged as a risk
in increased police-citizen investigatory encounters149 has hardly
abated.
2. Other Terry Stop Reasonable Suspicion Factors with
Particularization Problems
In the years since Terry, advocates, judges, and legal minds alike
have identified particularization issues with other common
Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 560-61 (2016); Huq,
supra note 139, at 2412.
143. See Fagan et al., supra note 142, at 559.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Abigail A. Sewell & Kevin A. Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of
Invasive Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URB. HEALTH 542, 542-43, 554-55 (2016);
see also Jessie Hellmann, Health Groups Call Police Brutality a Public Health Issue, THE HILL
(June 1, 2020, 6:34 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/500568-health-groups-callpolice-brutality-a-public-health-issue [https://perma.cc/VRM8-Q27D].
147. See CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 5-10 (2012), https://
ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4YUC-7MVT].
148. See NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES & THE CONTINUED FIGHT TO END
RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 13-14 (2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/naacp/
Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H467-9R4D]; ACLU FOUND. OF MASS.,
supra note 139, at 12-13.
149. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
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reasonable suspicion factors. One such factor is when the subject of
a Terry stop was in a “high crime area.”150 Although the Court
clarified that this factor standing alone is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion,151 its legitimacy as a reasonable suspicion factor at
all has been heavily questioned.152
These criticisms note that this factor has dangerous racial
discrimination implications, is vastly undefined, and does not
indicate an individual’s activity or criminality.153 In short, one’s
mere location in a certain neighborhood does not adequately contribute to particularized suspicion of an individual’s criminal
activity and arguably should not be entitled to much weight.154 As
such, some courts have begun to shy away from affording this factor
much influence in reasonable suspicion determinations.155
Similarly, legal minds have pointed to nervousness—another
common reasonable suspicion factor—as problematically unparticularized.156 They argue that “[v]irtually any behavior has been

150. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that running from the police or
otherwise behaving evasively in a high-crime area amounted to the requisite reasonable suspicion for a stop).
151. Id. at 123.
152. See Holt Ortiz Alden, Note, Discovering the Victim: The Enduring Problem with “HighCrime Areas,” 16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 385, 403-09 (2020) (surveying various critiques of this
factor in judicial and academic spheres).
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., id. at 407-09 (collecting sources arguing for a narrower and more objective
definition of high-crime area and other sources calling for abolishing this factor altogether);
Bloom, supra note 61, at 266 (arguing that, in the context of Terry stops in response to
completed, reported crimes, the high-crime area factor “is irrelevant—the crime has already
occurred”).
155. The Fourth Circuit recently “emphatically reject[ed]” giving this factor “any special
weight in determining whether the officers faced exigent circumstances,” stating that “[t]o do
so would deem residents of ... any ... high-crime area[ ]less worthy of Fourth Amendment
protection by making them more susceptible to search and seizure by virtue of where they
live.” United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 331 (4th Cir. 2020); see also, e.g., United States
v. Pedicini, 804 F. App’x 351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that being in a high-crime area
is relevant but “not absolute” and in this case was “further cabined by the fact that [the
defendant] merely drove through the area”).
156. See, e.g., Anthony J. Ghiotto, Traffic Stop Federalism: Protecting North Carolina Black
Drivers from the United States Supreme Court, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 323, 367-68 (2019)
(arguing that the reasonable suspicion standard is largely “built upon the subjective whims
of a police officer” and thus stops often lack the requisite particularized suspicion of criminal
activity); Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407,
437-38 (2006).
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deemed suspiciously nervous by police officers.”157 Nervousness is
also highly subjective and a common response to the presence of
police, especially for historically over-policed or mistreated communities.158 Critics also signal a more general problem with the Terry
standard’s clarity, arguing that the line between objective and subjective evidence, or between particularized or generalized evidence,
is blurry.159 Justice Thurgood Marshall similarly sounded alarm
bells that the basis for reasonable suspicion has become unparticularized, pointing to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s drug
courier profile’s “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular
set of observations.”160
The emergence of particularization concerns in the context of so
many other common reasonable suspicion factors demonstrates the
problems that result from a standard not carefully, narrowly
crafted. Terry stops in practice seem to have strayed from the
foundational intent of the Terry opinion, which stressed the need for
particularized, articulable suspicion.161 Additionally, the concerns
with other reasonable suspicion factors reveal that unparticularized
hunches have the ability to convincingly pass for articulable,
reasonable suspicion due to Terry being a totality-of-factors
standard. In other words, can a handful of factors legitimately add
up to reasonable suspicion if several—or all—of them have fundamental problems regarding insufficient particularization? The ideal
answer—no—demonstrates the need for more vigilance toward the
particularized nature of the factor at the heart of this Note: active
suspects’ physical descriptions.
B. Courts’ Tolerance for Vague or Discrepant Suspect
Descriptions in Reasonable Suspicion Determinations
Is Too High
The cases discussed in Part II, in which various courts made
reasonable suspicion determinations when an active suspect
157. Lerner, supra note 156, at 437.
158. Id. at 435-36.
159. See id. at 414-15.
160. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)).
161. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); supra Part I.
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description formed the primary basis for a Terry stop, demonstrate
inconsistency in courts’ interpretation of what amounts to reasonable suspicion. Courts’ tolerance levels for Terry stops based on
unparticularized descriptions—whether due to vagueness or appearance discrepancies—varied greatly from case to case.162
For courts that demonstrated an arguably high tolerance,163 the
police-deferential and public safety-concerned side of the Terry
Court’s balance164 tipped the scales too much. With such a highly
deferential application of Terry, law enforcement in many jurisdictions enjoy a very low bar as to how particularized this reasonable suspicion factor must be before stopping an individual. Given
the disparate rates at which racial minorities, especially Black men,
are the subjects of Terry stops,165 a low bar enabling so many stops
is impermissible. This opens the floodgates for all the harms—legal,
physical, psychological, and otherwise—that flow from Terry stops
and increased policing.166
Even for those courts that demonstrated a low tolerance for vague
or discrepant descriptions leading to Terry stops, it is important to
note that many were appellate courts reversing the decisions of
courts below that did find reasonable suspicion on the same facts.167
This demonstrates that there is disparity and inconsistency between
courts’ analysis of this factor—even within jurisdictions.
Further, courts only make reasonable suspicion determinations
once a defendant (if a Terry stop led to criminal charges) or plaintiff (when an individual sues on civil rights grounds regarding the
stop) proceeds past the plea bargaining or settlement stage, respectively. This is exceedingly rare, as at least 90 percent of criminal defendants take a guilty plea deal,168 and civil cases settle about as
frequently.169 For an individual to be in court challenging the
162. See supra Part II.
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., supra notes 94, 100 and accompanying text.
168. See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most
Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2F1Qxn7
[https://perma.cc/922G-58A8].
169. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html [https://perma.cc/
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reasonableness of a Terry stop, it means he or she had the wherewithal and financial means to persist past these earlier stages and
into a suppression hearing, trial, or possibly even an appeal.170 For
civil plaintiffs suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional rights
violations, qualified immunity makes holding police officers
accountable exceptionally difficult.171
This context requires one to consider how many individuals experience potentially unreasonable Terry stops but never have the
opportunity or forum for a meaningful examination of the stop’s
legality. In other words, there are enough problematic stops and differing reasonable suspicion interpretations to deduce that this issue
is even more pervasive than one sees. Therefore, it is critical that
police officers in the field have a clear understanding of what
amounts to reasonable suspicion regarding suspect descriptions.
The demonstrated variety in courts’ treatment of such physical descriptions—particularly those courts showing a high tolerance for
vagueness or discrepancies—signals that how particularized this
factor must be is anything but clear.
C. Courts’ High Tolerance Allows for Infringement of
Individuals’ Fourth Amendment Rights, and the Standard
Must Change
The Fourth Amendment serves to limit police conduct toward
individuals, keeping citizens protected from unreasonable intrusion.172 In creating a new doctrine that expanded rather than
constricted police latitude, the Terry Court stated that it must be
MB4M-9MQV] (finding that 80 to 92 percent of cases settle); see also Judicial Business 2017
Table C-4—U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken,
U.S. CTS. 1 (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_c4_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J34T-S4H4] (finding that less than 1 percent of federal
civil cases reached trial in fiscal year 2017).
170. For a discussion on the additional disadvantages that indigent criminal defendants
in particular face while advancing through the legal process, see generally Adam M.
Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85 (2007).
171. See generally Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified
Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 636-37,
644, 646, 652, 657 (2013).
172. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11, 15-16 (1968) (“The heart of the Fourth Amendment
... is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal
security.”).
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“narrowly drawn.”173 The Court acknowledged the dangers and
detriments of investigatory stops174 and reaffirmed the gravity of the
personal right at stake.175 When the time came to lay down a new
standard, the Terry Court intended it to be limited: reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot based on “specific and articulable facts,”176 not merely an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch.’”177 Without this particularization, then, an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry cannot comport with the Fourth
Amendment.178
Courts’ tolerance of unparticularized suspect descriptions providing reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop therefore threatens the
infringement of individuals’ Fourth Amendment liberties. When a
physical description is either so generic that it could apply to many
individuals in the area or is highly discrepant with the eventual
subject’s physical appearance, it lacks the particularization that
Terry requires. Of course, an unparticularized suspect description
may not disturb the presence of reasonable, articulable suspicion if
the totality of other factors and circumstances justified the Terry
stop.179 However, as discussed in Part II.A, in the context of an
active search for a suspect, the provided physical description will
often be the key driver of officers’ suspicion and the decision to stop
someone.
Therefore, given the harms and disparate policing that result
from description-based Terry stops, and given that Terry requires
particularized suspicion to comport with the Fourth Amendment,
the suspect description factor cannot continue to be weighed and
treated as it is now. Courts should no longer tolerate vague or discrepant suspect descriptions contributing to reasonable suspicion.

173. Id. at 27.
174. See id. at 11-15, 24-26.
175. See id. at 8-9 (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.” (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id. at 27.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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IV. HOW COURTS SHOULD WEIGH THE SUSPECT DESCRIPTION
FACTOR IN REASONABLE SUSPICION DETERMINATIONS
The deleterious effects of widespread and unreasonable Terry
stops, and the inconsistent and often highly police-deferential way
that courts approach the suspect description factor explored herein,
reveal a pronounced problem with modern Terry stop practices. A
new standard is needed to revitalize the particularization that Terry
and the Fourth Amendment require.
This new standard would foster consistency among courts, ensure
suspect descriptions informing reasonable suspicion are properly
particularized, and promote more reasonable and equitable police
conduct in the field. Because the new standard would simply
reinvigorate what Terry and the Fourth Amendment demand, rather than restrict police latitude, public safety would not suffer as a
result of the proposed new standard.
A. A New Standard
When an officer’s reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop is
based in any part on the target of the stop matching a physical
description of an active criminal suspect, the court’s reasonable
suspicion analysis should look for indicia that the description was
sufficiently particularized. This additional analysis regarding the
description factor will supplement—not replace—the typical totality-of-factors analysis. For this indicia-of-particularization analysis,
the court should consider: (1) the degree of discrepancy, including
the type of discrepancies,180 between the suspect description and the
detainee’s appearance, (2) the degree of vagueness of the description, and (3) the context in which the search for the suspect and
eventual Terry stop occurred as it relates to the likelihood that
many individuals in the area could have matched the description.

180. For example, a discrepancy between a navy blue jacket and a black one is quite
different from the suspect having black shoulder-length hair and the person stopped having
a blonde crew cut. Courts also, often rightfully, distinguish descriptors that can be easily
changed in a moment. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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These additional considerations will not result in a bright-line
rule—reasonable suspicion is, appropriately, a totality-of-the circumstances analysis. Rather, this new standard would require
courts to go through a supplementary layer of analysis on top of the
usual reasonable suspicion examination, still looking at the totality
of the circumstances.
Courts are already accustomed to performing an additional layer
of analysis with respect to an individual reasonable suspicion factor.
When an informant’s tip or 911 report of criminal activity contributes to an officer’s reasonable suspicion, courts look for “indicia of
reliability” of the information given.181 Courts perform a supplementary analysis with this factor, considering the degree to which the
tip’s predicted events or information are corroborated by the police’s
observations, the degree to which the tip provided information about
future acts or in-depth details rather than readily observable facts,
and whether the tip was anonymous or from a known informant or
citizen who identifies themself.182
Just as the additional standard around informant tips recognizes
the need for extra reliability considerations to ensure a Terry stop
possessed the requisite level of suspicion, the suspect description
factor warrants additional consideration as well. As discussed, the
courts’ inconsistency and high tolerance for lack of particularization
with this factor, coupled with the fact that it will often be the key
driver of suspicion for a stop in active suspect searches, demonstrate
the need for a supplementary standard.
Courts undertaking this additional consideration for the physical
description factor would better expose any lack of particularization
that may have otherwise been lost in the usual totality-of-factors
balance. This would foster more consistent approaches to this reasonable suspicion factor, as well as decrease courts’ tolerance of
unparticularized descriptions. Some courts appear to weigh these
considerations already,183 but a clearer, more standardized approach
is needed to truly ensure consistency among all courts.
181. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-30 (1990); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147-48 (1972).
182. See White, 496 U.S. at 330-31; Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-48.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing that
vague suspect descriptions can still provide reasonable suspicion when there is a lack of other
individuals or vehicles in the search area at the time).
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Further, this new standard would promote more reasonable and
particularized Terry stops by police officers. Rules excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment deter unreasonable police conduct, as “limitations upon the fruit to be gathered
tend to limit the quest itself.”184 As the Terry Court noted, while
exclusionary rules will not affect all police behavior, they serve to
discourage police misconduct.185 Courts indeed have the “responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or
harassing,” and do so through their exclusionary rulings.186 Thus,
this proposed reasonable suspicion standard with respect to physical
descriptions would help address unreasonable Terry stops and
searches in the field and the disparate impacts and harms that flow
from them.187
B. Counterargument: Public Safety Will Suffer if Police
Latitude Is Restricted
As discussed in Part I, “the Terry Court had the difficult task of
balancing the police-purported need for a workable tool short of
probable cause to use in temporary investigatory detentions and
protecting the people’s constitutional right against ... abusive police
power.”188 The purpose of authorizing Terry stops was to provide law
enforcement with more flexibility and “not prevent proactive
policing.”189 The clear counterargument to the proposed new standard will naturally be that placing limitations on the current Terry
standard “will unnecessarily constrain [law enforcement’s] expertise
and intuition in detecting crime.”190 If the police’s latitude and
flexibility are limited, some will argue, public safety will suffer.
While the impact that increased Terry stops have on general
crime reduction is debatable,191 these concerns are undoubtedly
184. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914
(2d Cir. 1930)).
185. Id. at 12-15.
186. Id. at 15.
187. See generally supra Part III.A.1.
188. Jones, supra note 27, at 513.
189. Id.
190. Henning, supra note 140, at 1566.
191. Compare Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1520-35 (2014) (finding
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prominent in the context of police conducting a Terry stop pursuant
to an active criminal suspect’s description. This particular scenario
contemplates a situation in which a crime is known to have very
recently been committed in the immediate area.192 When an individual has just committed a crime, particularly a violent or serious
offense, the desirability for police to be able to swiftly apprehend
that individual is high.
However, this proposed new standard is simply a return to the
particularization that Terry and the Fourth Amendment require.
The rules and standards of Terry are unchanged, and the additional
indicia of particularization analysis ensures that investigatory stops
better comport with Terry’s principles. When the Supreme Court
crafts a new constitutional rule, it is impermissible to stray outside
of that standard over the years. As such, this new standard represents a critically needed fine-tuning of modern stop and frisk
practices, grounded in Terry itself.
Requiring increased particularization with this factor is not only
essential for maintaining constitutionality and protecting individuals’ rights. Particularization also aids police officers in crime
prevention and apprehension. When police are actively searching for
a suspect, a more particularized physical description actually enhances public safety and ensures more efficient use of police
resources. When a suspect description is highly discrepant with the
appearance of an individual that officers encounter, this should
signal to the officers that they likely should continue searching.
Stopping this individual who is likely not their suspect wastes
precious time in an active search. If the discrepancies are reasonably explained, perhaps because it is dark outside or a physical
descriptor is one that could be easily and quickly changed, the proposed standard examining indicia of particularization would take
that into account.
that New York City’s mass stop and frisk efforts may have reduced gun possession and thus
violent crime and incarceration), with Press Release, N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, Latest Data:
Stop-and-Frisk and Crime Both Lowest in Years (Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter NYCLU, Latest
Data], https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/latest-data-stop-and-frisk-and-crime-bothlowest-years [https://perma.cc/3DKL-PKA6] (finding that “dramatic reduction in stops is not
jeopardizing public safety” as crime in New York City continued to fall to record lows
alongside a dramatic reduction in Terry stops).
192. See generally supra Part II.A.

1828

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1797

For example, in Mr. Harbin’s case discussed at the outset of this
Note, considering more carefully the many physical discrepancies
between him and the suspect, and perhaps the context of the search
area, would have helped officers realize that Mr. Harbin was not
their suspect.193 Mr. Harbin could have been spared the distressing
encounter, and officers could have saved time and effort better spent
on locating and apprehending the actual perpetrator.
Similarly, for descriptions that are unparticularized due to vagueness, the new standard would help instruct officers to consider the
context of the suspect search and whether a physical description is
so scant that it could apply to many individuals in the vicinity. This
would aid officers by signaling that they should gather more
physical descriptors from witnesses, if possible, or look for additional suspicious circumstances beyond the description—before
performing the stop—such as the way the individual is behaving.
Thus, whether officers are dealing with discrepant or overly
vague descriptions, the new standard would help—not hinder—in
identifying the perpetrator for more prompt and effective apprehension.194 The proposed new standard revitalizes the particularization requirement of Terry. Because this standard’s impact on
police work would improve public safety in active suspect searches,
and because it acts to reinforce individuals’ essential rights, it will
better allow the police to “serve and protect” their communities.
CONCLUSION
Courts’ tolerance of highly discrepant or vague suspect descriptions forming the basis of reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop
threatens Fourth Amendment infringement. A new standard is
critical to addressing this problem and revitalizing the particularization requirement handed down in Terry. The Terry Court
navigated a delicate balance between public safety needs and
193. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
194. New York City saw this effect following a dramatic reduction in Terry stops and frisks,
when data suggested that “fewer stops correspond[ed] to more effective stops.” NYCLU, Latest
Data, supra note 191. The proportion of stops that led to an arrest jumped from less than 10
percent each quarter from 2004 to 2012 to over 20 percent in the first quarter of 2016. Id.
Similarly, police stopped nearly 320,000 innocent people in the first six months of 2011 but
fewer than 6,000 innocent people in the first six months of 2016. Id.
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individuals’ constitutional protections against unreasonable search
and seizure. However, courts in the decades since have strayed past
the careful narrowness stressed in Terry, often demonstrating inconsistency and impermissible tolerance of unparticularized suspect
descriptions.
As a result, police perform Terry stops expansively today, targeting racial minorities disproportionately. This disparity, coupled
with the harms that Terry stops cause and the fact that particularization has been found to be lacking in several other common
reasonable suspicion factors, demonstrates the need for a restored
focus on particularized suspicion for Terry stops. A new standard is
needed to protect against infringement of individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
A new standard requiring courts to look for indicia of particularization regarding the physical description factor in reasonable
suspicion determinations would address this problem. By considering the three factors outlined herein, courts would help ensure the
particularization requirement around Terry stops is reinvigorated
and more carefully adhered to. The new indicia-of-particularization
standard would promote consistency among the courts when weighing this factor in reasonable suspicion determinations, and it would
improve police conduct and investigatory practices. This revitalization of truly particularized suspicion would refortify the constitutionally protected personal security rights that hang in the balance
when too many people can be stopped.
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